

Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAM-01 DHA-02 /091 W

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R 130800Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3783

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0630

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SO, FT, FR

SUBJECT: STIFFENING FRENCH RESOLVE: SIAD'S STRATEGY FOR DJIBOUTI

REF: A) PARIS 10564, B) MOGADISCIO 615, C) MOGADISCIO 609

SUMMARY: SIAD'S DETERMINATION TO ANNEX DJIBOUTI IS DANGEROUS AND REAL BUT LIMITATIONS ON HIS ABILITY TO ACHIEVE HIS ENDS ALSO REAL. SIAD'S STRATEGY FOR TFAI TAKEOVER BASED UPON ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE PROVING ERRONEOUS: FRENCH ARE NOT BEING FORCED OUT NOR IS INTERNATIONAL OPINION SOLIDLY WITH SDR. SIAD NEVER INTENDED THAT TFAI PEOPLE WOULD CHOOSE THEIR FUTURE IN REFERENDUM OR THAT OAU AND UN WOULD OVERSEE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY: ANARCHY NOT ORDER WAS SIAD FORMULA FOR POWER. CONTINUED FRENCH MIL PRESENCE AND, SHOULD FRENCH LEAVE, UN PEACEKEEPERS WILL BLUNT SIAD'S TACTICS. ALSO REFERENDUM UNDER UN SPONSORSHIP WHICH RESULTS IN STRONG INDEPENDENT LOCAL GOVT WITH OAU, ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES WILL HELP BLOCK SIAD. ANYTHING LESS - I.E., ALI AREF
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-- WILL PLAY INTO SIAD'S HANDS. US AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHEN FRENCH RESOLVE IN
TFAI. END SUMMARY

1. WE AGREE WITH PARIS' 10564 THAT WE SHOULD NOT RPT
NOT BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FRANCE'S DECOLONIZATION
PLANS FOR DJIBOUTI. WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE MORE REALISTIC
LOOK AT SIAD'S STRATEGY AND PUT HIS CAPACITY FOR DISORDER
IN HORN MORE SHARPLY IN PERSPECTIVE. WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND
THAT EVEN IF WE CANNOT PERSUADE SDR TO RENOUNCE ITS CLAIMS
TO TFAI, WE CAN NEVERTHELESS BLOCK ITS DESIGNS ON TERRITORY.

2. SIAD HAS MADE NUMBER OF MISCALCULATIONS ABOUT DJIBOUTI
AND I
BELIEVE THOSE ERRORS ARE NOW MORE CONSPICUOUS THAN
EVER. HIS BASIC MISTAKE WAS IN BELIEVING IN 1975 THAT PACE
OF AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION MEANT THAT TIME ALSO RIPE TO DE-

COLONIZE DJIBOUTI AND LEAVE SOMALIA IN POSSESSION OF FORMER
FRENCH COLONY. IN PLANNING FOR SOMALI TAKEOVER, SIAD HAD TO
TAKE THREE PROBLEMS INTO ACCOUNT: (A) FRENCH PRESENCE: (B)
ETHIOPIA AND (C) TFAI POULATIONS THEMSELVES. HE MADE FUNDA-
MENTAL ERRORS IN REGARD TO ALL THREE.

3. FRENCH PRESENCE: SIAD WAS ORIGINALLY PERSUADED THAT
STEPUP IN ACTIVITIES OF QTE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT UNQTE
--MEANING SOMALI-CONTROLLED FLCS -- WOULD DRAW INCREASING
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR GVN WITHDRAWAL, WHILE INTIM-
IDATION AND TERRORISM (KIDNAPPING OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR GUEURY
IN 1975 AND IN 1976 FRENCH SCHOOL CHILDREN AT DJIBOUTI) WOULD
ALSO BRING INCREASING DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON GISCARD D'ESTAING
FOR QUICK PULL OUT. HE COUNTED ON THIRD WORLD AND SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR FLCS WHICH HE HAS NOT RPT NOT GOTTEN. FRENCH HAVE
OUTFOXED HIM BY COOLY STAYING WITH THEIR TROUBLESOME COLONIAL
PROBLEM. MOREOVER,
FRENCH SHOWED AT LOYADA ON FEB 4 THAT THEY
CAPABLE OF MEETING TERRORISM WITH FORCE AND EVEN STRIKING
BACK AT SOMALI TERRITORY IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE AND THIS
WAS NOT RPT NOT DENOUEMENT SRD EXPECTED. GOF HAS ALSO SHOWN
THAT IT IS PREPARED TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY IN ARRANGING
FOR ORDERLY TRANSFER TO POWER IN TFAI. THIS ALSO IS NOT WHAT
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SIAD ANTICIPATED. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF POWER IS SIMPLY NOT
RPT NOT IN SOMALIA'S INTERESTS NOR FOR THAT REASON IS
IT PART OF SIAD'S STRATEGY.

4. ETHIOPIA: ETHIOPIAN MILITARY RESPONSE TO ANY SOMALI
GRAB AT DJIBOUTI IS PROBLEM WHICH CONTINUES TO PERPLEX
SIAD, NOTWITHSTANDING FACT THAT ANGOLAN PARALLEL GAVE HIM
HOPE THAT EPMG'S COMPETING CLAIM COULD BE RESOLVED IN

SIAD'S FAVOR, AS ANGOLAN PROBLEM -- WITH HELP OF US CONGRESS
-- WAS RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF MPLA AND USSR RATHER THAN
ROBERTO, MOBUTU AND US. IN STIMULATING SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA
SIADHAS ENROLLED FLCS IN REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD, HAS AD-
HERED AS COLSELY AS HE COULD IN ADDIS (OAU) AND MOSCOW (25TH
CPSU CONGRESS) TO MARXIST LINE AND DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO PERSUADE USSR AND SOCIALIST WORLD TO SUPPORT SOMALI POSI-
TION ON TFAI. WE HAVE HERE HOWEVER NO RPT NO EVIDENCE TO
SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW HAS ACCEPTED SOMALI CLAIMS TO TFAI. ON
THE CONTRARY, SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO BE STEERING CAUTIOUS
COURSE BETWEEN ITS INTERESTS IN ADDIS, PARIS AND MOGADISCIO
ON TFAI DECOLONIZATION.

5. AT SAME TIME, SIAD HAS STEPPED UP INSURGENCY IN OGADEN
AS HIS CONTRIBUTION TO DISSOLUTION OF ETHIOPIAN EMPIRE AND
TO WEAKENING OF ETHIOPIAN MILITARY. TACTICALLY SPEAKING,
SIAD IS IN MUCH BETTER POSITION THAN EPMG TO MOVE AGAINST
TFAI -- DESPITE EPMG MILITARY STRENCHTH OR SOVIET RESTRAINT
-- SINCE SNA COULD QUICKLY TAKE CITY OF DJIBOUTI ITSELF AND
THEN HOLD INDEFINITELY WHILE CONFRONTATION DREW INTERNATIONAL
ATTENTION AND OAU, UN AND PERHAPS US AND USSR INTERVENED
DIPLOMATICALLY TO SUSPEND HOSTILITIES.

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INFO/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 4645

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0630

6. SIAD'S PRESENT PROBLEM WITH MILITARY INTERVENTION HOW-
EVER IS WITH FRENCH RATHER THAN ETHIOPIAN FORCES. SNA WILL
NOT MOVE AGAINST FRENCH MILITARY. CONTINUED PRESENCE OF
FRENCH TROOPS THEREFORE FRUSTRATE SIAD'S PLANS. MORE IM-
PORTANTLY, HOWEVER, PRESENCE OF OUTSIDE PEACEKEEPERS,
WHETHER FROM OAU, UN OR ARAB LEAGUE WOULD CONTINUE TO
FRUSTRATE SIAD'S PLANS AFTER DEPARTURE OF FRENCH.
REASON SIAD HAS RESISTED MEDIATION ROLE FOR OUTSIDERS --
AND UN AND OAU IN PARTICULAR -- IS THAT HIS PLANS FOR OAU
AND UN REQUIRE THAT THEY INTERVENE
AFTER BUT NOT BEFORE
SOMALIA HAS MOVED. THIS IS WHY SIAD DID NOT RPT NOT WISH
LOYADA INCIDENT TO BE DISCUSSED AT UN SECURITY COUNCIL:
EXPOSURE OF FRENCH/SOMALI DISPUTE AT UNSC MIGHT HAVE BROUGHT
UN FORMULA FOR ARRANGING PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF POWER, PER-
HAPS INCLUDING PEACEKEEPERS, AND MIGHT HAVE LIMITED SIAD'S
ABILITY TO FIRST GAIN HIS ENDS BY MILITARY FORCE IF NEED BE.
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SIAD WANTS UN TO SERVE HIS NEEDS, NOT FRANCE'S.

7. SELF DETERMINATION FOR TFAI POPULATIONS: SIAD'S CLAIMS
THAT HE WISHES GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR PEOPLES OF
TERRITORY ARE TOTALLY FALSE. SIAD'S PLANS HAVE NEVER IN-
CLUDED HOLDING A LEGITIMATE REFERENDUM FOR PEOPLES OF TER-
RITORY WHICH MIGHT ALLOW THEM TO EXPRESS THEIR DESIRE FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION OR FOR UNION WITH SOMALIA. ON CONTRARY,
HE HAS CONTINUED TO INSIST UPON PRECONDITIONS FOR INDEPEN-
DENCE WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD MAKE SUCHREFERENDUM WHOLLY
IRRELEVANT. ALL OF HIS CNDITIONS -- I.E., DISSOLUTION OF
TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY, RETURN OF POL REFUGEES, DISMANTLING OF
BARBED WIRE FENCE AND MINEFIELD, AND HOLDING OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION TO INCLUDE ALL LIB GROUPS -- SIMPLY PROVIDE
A FORMULA FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL ANARCHY IN TFAI WHICH WOULD
ENABLE SRD TO WIN TERRITORY EITHER BY MIL FORCE OR BY POLITI-
CAL SUBVERSION. AGAIN, ONE OF REASONS SIAD HAS PROTESTED
OUTSIDE ROLE AND AVOIDING RAISING MATTER IN UN IS THAT SUCH
INTERVENTION MIGHT INCREASE CHANCES FOR PEACEFUL TRANSFER
OF POWER, INCLUDING THE HOLDING OF GENUINE REFERENDUM. SIAD
KNOWS WHAT GOF AND OTHERS PERHAPS DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW --
THAT GIVEN OPPORTUNITY, DJIOUTI POPULATIONS, WHETHER AFAR
OR SOMALI, WOULD VOTE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND NOT RPT
NOT PARTICIPATION IN SOMALI PROTECTORATE.

8. SO LONG AS SIAD PURSUES STRATEGY DESCRIBED ABOVE,

THEN GOF CAN EXPECT NO RPT NO MEANINGFUL COLLABORATION
FROM SDR IN ARRANGING PEACEFUL DECOLONIZATION OF TERRI-
TORY. WE DOUBT THAT SIAD WILL CHANGE HIS STRATEGY, NOT
RPT NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF HIS IRREDENTIST AMBITIONS BUT
BECAUSE INDEPENDENT TFAI REPRESENTS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
THREAT TO HIS REGIME (MOG 615). BUT GOF DOES HOLD FEW
CARDS SIAD DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT FRENCH TO PLAY, INCLUDING
ITS SECURITY COUNCIL OPTION SHOULD REPETITION OF FLCS
TERRORISM OCCUR. OAU AND UN PEACEKEEPERS COULD BE CALLED
UPON TO PLAY GREATER ROLE THAN GOF SEEMS WILLING TO ACCEPT.

9. BUT STRONGEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO SIAD'S
AMBITIONS IN TFAI WILL BE A STABLE
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVT
IN DJIBOUTI, FREELY CHOSEN BY LOCAL POPULATIONS AND ONE IN
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WHICH SOMALI ISSAS, ISHAAKS AND GADABURSI THEMSELVES HAVE A
PROMINENT ROLE. GOF, OAU AND PERHAPS EVEN UN HAVE
RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSURE THAT SUCH A GOVT ASSUMES POWER IN
DJIBOUTI. THIS IS SURE WAY TO BLUNT SIAD'S TROUBLE-MAKING FROM
MOGADISCIO. FORMULA ARRANGED AT FRENCH CONVENIENCE AND WITH
ETHIOPIAN CONNIVANCE TO PUT NON-REPRESENTATIVE FIGURE IN POWER
AT EXPENSE OF LOCAL SOMALI POPULATIONS MUST INEVITABLY BREAK
DOWN TO SIAD'S FINAL ADVANTAGE. WITH UN-SUPERVISED REFERENDUM,
SOMALI VOTERS IN TFAI WOULD REPUDIATE SIAD'S WHOLLY DISHONEST
CLAIM THAT SDR ALONE REPRESENTS THEIR INTERESTS.
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